Football Journey

The African Champions Cup finished in December 1982. There was a sense of normalization at last – only one club withdrew, US Goree (Senegal). The other sign of normalization was the clubs, reaching the semi-finals – they represented Nigeria (Enugu Rangers), Egypt (Al-Ahly), Zaire (FC Lupopo), and Ghana (Asante Kotoko). That is, teams from the countries recognized for advanced football on the continent. Al-Ahly and Asante Kotoko qualified to the final. On the surface, the finalists were different – Al-Ahly never reached continental final. Asante Kotoko was going to its 5th final, having won the Cup once in 1970. As a whole, Ghanaian football was represented at the final for 7th time and Egypt’s – for a 3rd time. However, both countries won the trophy only once before – Asante Kotoko in the 1970s and Al Ismaily in 1969 for Egypt. Technically, Asante Kotoko should have had the edge not only by tradition, but also because Ghana just became the continental champion, but the Egyptians were economically better and since they did not participated in the last issue of the African Cup of Nations, there was no way of comparing strength.

The first leg was in Cairo and it pretty much decided the winner – Al-Ahly finished with a 3-0 lead. Two weeks later, in Kumasi, Al-Ahly tied the second leg 1-1 and won the Cup.

This is picture of Al-Ahly in 1981, which at least is a close approximation of the new cup holders. It was a great triumph for the club, but also for the country. As for the squad… nothing really can be said. May be the only thing of real import was the coming of sponsorship to Africa – in this case, the deodorant firm Old Spice. The international victory was important in another sense too – Al-Ahly was the strongest Egyptian club – since the establishment of the national championship in 1949, they won 17 titles (including 1982) in the 26 championships played. Such strong tradition needed international success and at last Al-Ahly got it.

The other big international championship of the year was the 13th African Cup of Nations. It took place before the World Cup and, as ever before, did not attract any attention outside Africa, perhaps even less then before. The championship went throw preliminary stages, somewhat better scheduled than in the earlier editions, and final tournament of 8 finalists, hosted by Libya. The hosts and the current holders of the title – Nigeria – qualified directly for the finals, so the rest of the continent played for 6 places. And as ever before earlier stages were not played completely, for teams withdrew up to the finals – Benin, Uganda, Gabon in the preliminary round; Tanzania and Equatorial Guinea in the first round; Egypt in the second round. Politics played bigger role than lack of money and the political factor was entirely unpredictable, often changing in the last minute, and hard to figure out, for there were domestic political factors and international hostilities both playing role. And on top of everything – football politics, which were even more mysterious. Upper Volta did not appear at all in the first round, but went directly to the second round, for instance – possibly, it was lucky draw, for the number of countries qualifying to the first round was uneven – 23. And only in the second round Upper Volta played football – they qualified in the preliminary round without playing, for Gabon withdrew, then they apparently got lucky buy and at last played their first match in the second round against Algeria, which utterly destroyed them – 0-7. Hosting the second leg, Upper Volta managed a 1-1 tie and was out – but if they had been lucky again in this round, having to meet Egypt, instead of Algeria, they would have reached the finals without playing a single match. But who knows… against Upper Volta, Egypt may have decided to play. Since African football had no consistency so far, plus having been unknown, there was pretty much no way to judge were there any major upsets: Zaire, seemingly strong football country, was eliminated in the second round, but by Ghana, another continental ‘powerhouse’, so it was not exactly a surprise elimination. This was perhaps the only traditionally strong team missing the finals. The final 8 were divided into two round-robin groups, which played in two coastal Libyan cities on stadiums surprisingly large for anyone paying attention: of 50 000 and 80 000 capacities. That was another thing – during the late 1960s and the 70s, many African nations built large stadiums. Larger than most European stadiums. The sport was popular, but the reason for erecting large facilities was difficult to explain: yes, there was consideration of future needs, but it was also something to boast about, an easy way ‘to solve’ social and economic problems, and also to have facilities for major public political events like parades. Libya had no strong football, even by African measures, but had plenty of oil money and a dictator – stadiums were built. Anyhow, the finals proceeded game after game and when the group stage was completed, it was mostly interesting as a compliment to African performance at the following World Cup.

Group A (Tripoli)

1.LIBYA 3 1 2 0 4- 2 4

2.GHANA 3 1 2 0 3- 2 4

3.Cameroon 3 0 3 0 1- 1 3

4.Tunisia 3 0 1 2 1- 4 1

Group B (Benghazi)

1.ALGERIA 3 2 1 0 3- 1 5

2.ZAMBIA 3 2 0 1 4- 1 4

3.Nigeria 3 1 0 2 4- 5 2

4.Ethiopia 3 0 1 2 0- 4 1

The top 2 of each group went to the semi-finals. Both matches were played on March 16. In Benghazi Ghana prevailed over Algeria in overtime 3-2. It was dramatic match – Algeria was leading 2-0 in the 62nd minute and Ghana equalized just before the final whistle in the 90th minute.

In Tripoli, the hosts won 2-1. Zambia was the first to score in the 29th minute, but eventually the Libyans scored 2 goals in the 38th and 84th minutes.

The match for the bronze, played in Tripoli, went for Zambia – they won 2-0. Algeria finished 4th.

The final, also played in Tripoli, was another drama – Libya and Ghana played to a tie in the group stage, in which Ghana equalized in the last moment – 89th minute. They were first to score a goal, though, and the pattern repeated in the final – Ghana scored in the 35th minute, thanks to Alhassan. Libya equalized in the 70th minute by Beshari. Neither team managed to score another goal – not in regular time and not in the overtime. The winner had to be decided by penalty shoot-out and only here Ghana prevailed 7-6.

Ghana won the championship, maintaining its status as the most successful African team – it was their 4th.

Libya achieved its biggest success, but was unable to win even when coming very close. Most likely it was incidental success, due to home turf, large supportive audience, and the usual help officials provide to hosting nations. Murkier details are not even important: Africa was full of dictators pulling their weight, so there was nothing strange if Qaddafi did as the others. Under-the-table money were part of the game everywhere too. Visiting teams hardly ever brought supporters wit them for the obvious reason: wide-spread African poverty and lack of convenient transportation. Hosts had the advantage by all accounts and no big deal.

Ghana was another story – first of all, its record was getting long: success in the 1960s (1963 and 1965), 1970s (1978), and now in the 1980s. Strong continuity, but the successes of the national team run against international club records and the fact that the country so far did not reach World Cup finals. Because of that the players were entirely unknown and the winning team had no European-based professionals. But there were two foreign-based players: George Alhassan played for FC 105 (Gabon) and the captain Emmanuel Quarshie for Zamalek (Egypt). Africa was technically amateur as a whole, but professionalism was beginning to creep in one way or another. There was no doubt that Alhassan and Quarshie were paid for their services in Gabon and Egypt – otherwise there was no reason at all to go there, especially to Gabon, which generally was in worse economic state than Ghana. There was one more interesting case in the winning team, but it brings the coach first of all to the light:

Charles Kumi Gyamfi was and perhaps still is Ghanaian football legend, but he was also more than just football hero. As a player, he was winner of the African Cup of Nations – this is the sporting part. He was also ‘king’, one of many tribal aristocrats, which provided him with funds to travel, meet, and watch the sport’s greats – as the picture shows, he went to see the 1962 World Cup in Chile. Thus, he gathered current knowledge of the development of the game, which few African coaches had even in the early 1980s. And he had enough political clout because of his status. To a point, he was better positioned than European and South American coaches in Africa, for it was difficult for politicians to tamper his choice of players, tactics, and preparation. Yet, some would say he favoured his own people at the expense of others, but this was a reality in Africa anyway – in his case, he was in position to easily defend himself: his team won the continental championship, he was success both as a player and as a coach. Among his chosen squad was the forward Ben Kayede, playing for Aurora, not a first division club. This was a problem, because it looked like Gyamfi favored second-rate talent and the inclusion of Kayede provoked a lot of criticism from all sides. The ‘unfriendly fire’ is easy to understand, but the ‘friendly fire’ needs explaianation: Aurora was not independent club, but the second team of Ghanaian big club Hearts of Oak. A B team, a farm club, the place those either too young or not good enough were sent to get experience. So, a player not good even for the bench of Hearts of Oak was suddenly in the national team – but the boy so well and Gyamfi was right. As for the age of the hero, it was hard to say how important it was – most likely he was very young, but African teams often included teenage players in their national teams and the future internationally recognized star Abedi Pele in the Ghanaian squad was only 17 years old at the moment. Anyhow, clout and keen eye surely helped Gyamfi in the building of the winning team and not only because of Kayede case – he relegated three ‘senior’ players to the bench – Seth Ampadu, Opoku Afriyie and Joe Carr – replacing them with Sampson Lamptey, George Alhassan and Owusu Mensah. After coming back with the continental cup nobody had the guts to protest and criticize – Gyamfi was right all the way.

But it was not just Ghana to focus on: this championship was particularly interesting after the World Cup. Cameroon and Algeria reached the African championship finals. Cameroon was eliminated at the first stage, but without losing a match. However, they won none too – three ties, which they repeated the Cameroonians repeated at the World Cup a few months later to the letter: even their scoring record was the same – 1-1. Algeria won their preliminary group and finished 4th in the African championship, but only the shameful scheming of West Germany and Austria prevented them from reaching the second round of the World Cup. Suddenly, there was more to African football then ever before: take out Libya, but Ghana and Zambia were seemingly at the same level as Cameroon and Algeria – that is, pretty much at par with the European and South American teams. At last Africa came strong – the best teams were not exactly running on occasional enthusiasm, but were actually close to the best: judging by the World Cup performance of the losers of the African championship. That meant further development, boosted by more African players getting professional contracts in Europe. May be , after years of empty prophesies, African football came of age in 1982 – ironically, at continental finals nobody cared for and almost completely forgotten right away.

The aftermath. Commentaries and evaluations of the World Cup continued for months, as ever, and summery of them would be something like that:

Nothing particularly new was shown at the finals. Nothing revolutionary for sure – there was evolution only, into something named ‘rational football’. By now, elements of total football were a must – changing positions, covering the whole field, pressure of the opponent, physical fitness. As a whole, the defensive elements of the old total football were present, but a lot of the real strength of the it – the attacking ones, were not much in evidence. Rational football was pretty much that and it had something cold and cynical at its roots: overrun the opponent and break it down, no matter how. ‘Professional fouls’ became the norm: it was even easier to kick down the opponent and stop their attack in early stage than trying to get the ball cleanly. Only victory mattered and victory became quite a wide term after the shameless meeting of West Germany and Austria – one can get what they want even by losing. But nothing else than final victory mattered anymore, it was a war and instead of total football, there was total war.

The torn jersey of Ardiles against Italy exemplified best the new philosophy at its ugliest.

The new formula was generally seen as successful: 24 teams was not the perfect number, but it was a matter of refining only. On the positive side were the outsiders – with the exception of El Salvador, the rest played well. The biggest revelation was the wonderful performance of the African teams – they were up to date tactically and pretty much equal to the Europeans and South Americans. Asian teams obviously improved too – to give more spots to the ‘developing world’ was clearly a step in the right direction. Out of 6 ‘outsiders’ only one – El Salvador – equaled the old notion of an outsider.

Cameroon was arguably the strongest ‘outsider’ and the big discovery, coming very close to reaching the second stage, along with Algeria, which was plainly robbed of advancing, but Cameroon left stronger and more lasting impression – they were truly equal to the ‘big teams’. New Zealand, Kuwait, and Honduras lost and were still weaker, yet, they played competent football and no fear.

Referees are always criticized, but seemingly this time there were too many mistakes – to the point that it was questionable are the referees up to date with the modern game. It is difficult to say which incident was the worst – Schumacher sending Battiston to hospital for months, almost killing him; Gentile systematically destroying the best players of the opposite team; the penalties given to Spain or the penalties not given to USSR.

Perhaps the accident of the long stoppage during the France – Kuwait match, involving the Police was the worst – the Soviet referee Stupar did the unthinkable: bending under outside pressure, changing his mind, and disallowing a goal already called a score. It was not mere mistake and it was not putting a blind eye – it was reversing a decision, because somebody from the stands said so. The shame of the meeting between West Germany and Austria, however, showed entirely new problem, going outside the rules – the teams clearly did not play, fixing convenient for both result in the very beginning. Yet, technically, there was nothing to be done – they moved the ball around. Wasting time was done for years, but as long as the ball moves… it was inside the rules.

Fans. Hooliganism was still British phenomenon, but it was developing to the point when it was actually preferred Birtish teams not to reach finals. There was no other solution so far, especially because violence happened largely outside the stadiums. The biggest threat were the English fans.

Politics. This was coming to the realm of the exotic – the Falkland Islands war had importance before the beginning of the World Cup: England considered to withdrawal, but decided to play.

The Argentines made a patriotic photo of themselves, which was almost grotesque – foorball players are supposed to smile at such photos, and they did. But a war is hardly a laughing, jolly matter. At the end, only Ardiles suffered from the conflict – he had to move to play in France for awhile, although neither he, nor Tottenham Horspur wanted that.

Two records were set:

Norman Whiteside of Manchester United and Northern Ireland became the youngest player ever, playing at World Cup finals – he bettered Pele by few months, still 17-years old in round numbers. And it is a record unlikely to be bettered.

At 40, Dino Zoff became the oldest player to appear at World Cup finals – his record was bested in 2014, but he also became the oldest world champion, which very likely is not going to be equaled or bested.

Two teams captured the minds, leaving many observers to optimistic statements – Brazil and France.

Football was alive, because of them and they introduced pleasant styles, bringing joy back to the game. But it was painfully clear that ‘rational’ football was getting the upper hand – both artistic teams were eliminated by teams with the opposite philosophy. Compared to the brutal teams, thinking of war, not of fun, Brazil and France appeared naïve. They also made very clear that the new reality required strong players at every position – may be not great players, but competent and strong above average: both France and Brazil lacked good goalkeepers and paid dearly for that – it was no longer possible to compensate a weak position by simply outscoring the opponent.

Injuries – an old and inevitable plague, but it looked like no other World Cup was so much affected by injuries. Rummenigge, Keegan, Boniek, Platini, and others were either not fit and suffering during the tournament, or missing key games. Perhaps Belgium paid the highest price – with van der Elst arriving injured and Pfaff and Gerets getting injured early in the tournament, Belgium was simply destroyed. Current football was collective and individuals seemingly mattered less, yet, it became clear that results depended mostly on key stars – without them collectivity was not lost, but the team was losing, not winning. But the new kind of players were pretty much similar work-horses and the absence of a star was getting nearly fatal – back in 1962, Brazil had enough talent to win the World Cup without injured Pele. It was no longer possible in 1982, almost no team had a player capable of replacing a star – and the coaches, without options and fearing a loss, preferred to field injured players, even when it was clear they contribute next to nothing.

Discoveries. The World Cup was still the place to find hew talent and a market place. For most of the world, it was the moment to see at last those only heard of – Socrates, Falcao, Maradona. Along with them were the entirely unknown, like Thomas N’Kono. Frankly, not much real discoveries were made and Maradona underperformed. But considering the transfer contracts, the World Cup remained the number one place to get noticed or confirm one’s worth – Platini and Boniek signed with Juventus, Pfaff with Bayern (with specific clause about behavior, for Pfaff had a record of short temper bursts and misconduct), N’Kono with Espanol, Maradona with Barcelona. Africans moved to Europe, South Americans too, the New Zealander Winton Ruffer was not missed and also got European contract – the World Cup was important and players knew it well – this was giving hope for the future, for players were going to try their best at the finals to get noticed.

Thomas N’Kono, one of the genuine discoveries of the World Cup, instantly becoming a star.

The best of the finals were both obvious and controversial – yes, there were discoveries and players performing more than well. Lato, for example, who got a second wind. Others did not satisfy at all. Yet, no matter what people saw and what journalists commented during the tournament, the team of the World Cup displayed something else: Dino Zoff (Italy), Luizinho (Brazil), Junior (Brazil), Claudio Gentile (Italy), Fulvio Collovati (Italy), Zbigniew Boniek (Poland), Falcao (Brazil), Michel Platini (France), Zico (Brazil), Paolo Rossi (Italy), Karl-Heinz Rummenigge (West Germany). The new World champions got most players, as ever, but some were here on reputation, rather than actual performance, or because there were no really great players as some posts. The very system – 4-4-2 – suggested the change, favouring ‘realistic’ football – fewer strikers. Paolo Rossi was voted best player of the tournament, which was a bit suspect – like in 1978, there was no really fascinating and great player from start to end, and those playing well at the last stages were preferred. Rossi also was the best scorer – with 6 goals, all scored in the last three games. Not much… no more great scorers, was the sad conclusion.

Maradona and Socrates – both out of the best 11, but voted among the top 15 players of the championship. Socrates was great, Maradona – almost nothing. He particularly failed a s leader and many felt he was greatly inflated player. That was also a brief summary of the finals – highs and lows, fulfilled and unfulfilled expectations, and the sad reality of ‘realistic’ football – both players went home early. The third player of similar fame and caliber – Platini – fared differently:

He performed as expected, coming to his peak. He led France as a true leader and to a higher point than Brazil and Argentina. And he was a problem in the same time, noticed well before the finals – France was often stronger and certainly more collective without him. Without him, France was losing leadership, some creativity, and scoring power. With him it was not so together and was a weaker fighter. Peculiar problem for Michel Hidalgo, but also a general problem with the establishment of ‘realistic football’ – artistry was becoming liability and there was no real place for imaginative players. Better play like the Germans – no fun workaholics, extracting positive result at the end.

More or less, that was the summary of the 1982 World Cup.

 

The big final at last. Italy vs West Germany. The early German crimes turned a lot of people against them, but sentimental wishes have nothing to do with reality. So far, West Germany was not convincing on the field and Italy vastly improved after very weak beginning. Small plus for Italy in terms of plying the game, but nobody was forgetting the special German ability to deliver when mattered most. There was no doubt that both teams will be highly motivated, but exactly here the Germans had the edge. Italians played dirty when in trouble, but not only the Germans showed similar ability, they also showed that could be entirely ruthless. Their pressure was relentless and were physically stronger than the Italians. On the other hand, Italy was by far the more technical team and had more players capable of improvising. Antognoni, Rossi, the brightly improving every next match Conti, plus generally intelligent teammates was much more than what West Germany had – practically, only Breitner for interesting constructive attacks, eager Littbarski and may be Stielike, if Breitner let him. West Germany was very strong, but also very straight-forward and predictable in this version. They were going to attack and Italy most likely was going to depend on counter-attacks, which may not be lethal against German defenders and goalkeeper like Schumacher. It was 50-50… sentimentality preferred Italy somewhat, unless they started playing ugly. Gentile was a starter after all. But not Antognoni… injuries were the plaque of this championship and the last victim was Antognoni, unable to play at the final – which made Bearzot fielding a 5th defender in his place, thus seemingly giving the edge to the Germans in advance. As for Derwal… either blinded by the goal Rummenigge scored against France, or just scared, but he decided to start with unfit Rummenigge instead of trying something else. Magath was benched. Unpleasant picture emerged as a strong possibility: Gentile chopping down Rummenigge, thus leaving the Germans with practically 10 players and greatly reducing the German attacking power. But all that was still possibilities, arguments, suppositions – they lasted until the referee gave the start of the final.

Quickly became clear that West Germany could hope only for a miracle – the Italians not only neutralized the German assault, but matched them in speed and mobility. Of course, defense was their primary concern, but they executed perfectly their tactical plan and moved forward, creating danger in front of the German net. Lacking imagination, the Germans lost the battle relatively early and the inevitable happened in the 25th minute, when Briegel brought down Conti in the penalty area.

Cabrini stepped in and… missed the penalty shot. This, seemingly, was crucial moment: it was supposed to inspire at last the Germans and perhaps crush the spirit of more fragile mentally Italians. But the opposite happened – Italy was unshaken, even more determined, and West Germany was the same. It was tough match, of course, and no mercy was shown, yet, it was not a dirty match.

It was almost painful to watch Breitner trying to create something, but was never understood by his simple-minded teammates.

Rummenigge, closely marked, as expected, was a pale shadow of himself. As time passed, it was increasingly clear that Derwall made a mistake starting with Rummenigge. Perhaps his biggest mistake. Italy, on the other hand, never did anything wrong. Strikers moved back to help their defenders, but were quick to go into attacks – unselfish, collective approach, which turned the scales entirely in Italian favour. One thing Italy was a big master of was patience – the first half ended 0-0, but they already controlled the match and the result was not a bother. As for West Germany, only lucky strike would helped them – the best what possibly would happen was to keep the tie, including in extra-time, and hope to win the penalty shoot-out. No such luck.

Rossi scored in the 57th minute and after that Tardelli and Altobelli finished the Germans – 3-0 in the 81st minute. Derwall made changes – Hrubesch replaced Dremler in the 63rd minute and Hansi Muller substituted Rummenigge in the 71st minute, but it was felt that the changes were too late to make any difference. Still the Germans managed to score – Breitner, in the 83rd minute, but he got no consolation from it. It was nice to see the revered veteran of 1974 and the only interesting player the Germans had score, but West Germany lost the final already. As for Italy, Bearzot fielded Causio a minute before the final whistle – it looked like a nice tribute to one of the greatest Italian players of the 1970s, who was no longer starter and surely was not going to play at another World Cup. It was also a tribute to a long road of development, of shaping a team for many years, and Causio was key player of the earlier years of building. Italy won 3-1, fair and square, to the relieve of many, who so the Italian victory as a revenge, righting the wrongs West Germany did to the sport. Looked like football triumphed at last against brutal scheming.

Italy lifted the World Cup and who deserved it more than Paolo Rossi, the top scorer of the championship?

Enzo Bearzot, that’s who. The coach endured years of heavy criticism, sticking stubbornly to his vision, trusting his players, answering cruel questions. There was whole army insisting he must be fired because the team was not winning, the players were too old, few changes were made. Bearzot smoked his pipe coolly until his boys conquered the world.

West Germany got silver, which many considered undeserved. What happened to the wonderful team of only two years back? There was not a trace of it. Yes, there were injured players, particularly Rummenigge; yes, the players were tired and had very short training camp. Yes, Bernd Schuster refused to play for the national team. And yes, Derwall screw up. So much so, he had to step down. May be too soft and bending to the dictatorial whims of ‘Bayern mafia’, namely Breitner and Rummenigge. May be just having no guts, for, from aside, Derwall appeared scared of taking risks even when plainly nothing was going right. He played unfit and clearly useless Rummenigge. Stielike was given mostly defensive functions. The team used only two strikers most of the time and it was more than questionable how effective Fischer and Rummenigge could be – one out of form and the other an English kind of centre-forward, who rarely got high balls to fight for, win, and score. Hansi Muller and Magath were not starters most of the time, thus limiting further already limited creativity. West Germany were just strong robots going to a war – but tactically impoverished, they produced only massive dull assault to everything that moved. Silver medals were too much for this team.

Italy became world champion for a third time, equalizing Brazil. It was a long, long wait – since 1938. They were deserving champions too, but also strange champions. Yes, they eliminated Argentina, Brazil, and West Germany, the biggest favourites before the start of the championship and in the case of Brazil – the team almost everybody saw as the new champions until the match with Italy. But in the first phase Italy was more than sluggish and qualified to the next round more or less by chance. It was almost 50-50: three weak games and 4 strong ones, hardly the most convincing winners. And observers had a hard time to distinguish players – individually, the Italians were not the top players at any position. They also did not endear fans and specialist – there were villains among them, particularly Gentile. Tactically, Italy was a step back too – seemingly, moving away from total football and into improved and covering the whole field 1960s tactics: defense first, counter-attacks, personal marking. Paolo Rossi was the hero not just because of his goals, but largely because he did not play organized football for two years and until May of 1982 – his form was a miracle. But his play was not better than before, may be even weaker than the one displayed in 1978. Perhaps the only player who was a discovery at this championship was Bruno Conti. Italy was strong as a collective following the required tactics to the letter and having enough skills to improvise if there was an opportunity. Yet, they were fair winners, outplaying the Germans at the final and even pleasing the crowds.

 

 

The match for the third place should be mentioned largely for aspects of the evolution of the perception of the game. Michel Hidalgo started with his reserves – only 4 regular players were in the starting eleven – Amoros, Tresor, Janvion, and Tigana, Later Six came as a substitute. On the surface, it looked like as a fair decision – let’s give a chance to the unused players, those who only watched so far, to taste world cup football. It was never done before, so it was also revolutionary decision. On the surface. Under it laid real reasons, none too good: the interest about the ‘small final’ was already thinning out, replaced by the new philosophy that only first place matters. France was not really interested in third place… it was nothing. It is not clear, but many observers wrote that the match was silver and bronze medals – if so, FIFA was not helping in preserving the importance of this match: if both teams were getting medals anyway, so why playing at all? There was no real stimulus. The development of this world cup made the match anti-climactic – the losses of Brazil and France killed the thrill. Somehow, it did not matter at all and France confirmed that by fielding its reserves, which immediately suggested that they were not interested and the match was almost a protocol. Poland, however, took it seriously and that further diminished the interest, for there was not going to be equality on the field and Poland appeared to be sure winner. And it was… the French second-stringers were pleasant to watch and since Poland was not greatly superior anyway, for a while the game was fairly equal and mildly entertaining. The French scored first, but hat was pretty much all they did – Poland started dominating and scoring, helped by the mistakes of the French goalkeeper Castaneda. If anything, his play made painfully clear one essential problem of the French team – no strong goalkeeper. Hidalgo said that much before the beginning of the championship, but it was more than obvious now: Baratelli practically refused to play from start, claiming nerves, Ettori was adequate at best, and Castaneda… was nothing.

Szarmach equalized in the 41st minute, then Majewski scored (on the picture) scored in the 45th minute, only Kupciewitz making it 3-1 in the 47th minute. Match finished. Couriol scored a second goal for France in the 73rd minute, but it not important – it was clear by now that France had no heart and no means of winning. Seemingly, did not aim at winning from start. Poland won 3-2 and justly got 3rd place – or silver medals, depending on who was telling.

France – 4th.

Poland – bronze medalist.

West Germany – France. The Germans played nothing so far and the memory of the disgrace against Austria was fresh, so France was the preferred and desired winner. Besides, France was the most entertaining team after Brazil. Platini was back, so France had its finest team. Derwall made adjustments – disappointing Rummenigge was benched and Magath was a starter. Also Littbarski. Both teams started with 4-4-2 schemes, more pronounced in the German team. It was dubious approach for the Germans to start with only two strikers – Littbarski and Fischer – but it was also clear by now Derwall run out of options. Thanks to the French, the match was entertaining and dramatic. The Germans did what they could – heavy pressure, excellent physical condition, attacking minded. They scored first, in the 18th minute. Pierre Littbarski proved his worth. This was perhaps the most important moment of the match, for France was known for bending under pressure and losing concentration. Not this day.

Platini equalized from a penalty in the 28th minute. The game was fast and France was seemingly the better team, but the minutes were running out without a second goal. The Germans were not very effective in their own attacks and Hrubesch came out, replacing Magath, but it was desperate move, for Fischer and Hrubesch were identical center-forwards. But earlier in the second half the second German disgrace, overshadowing even the shameful game with Austria, happened – deliberately and brutally Tony Schumacher almost killed Patrick Battiston.

It was not a questionable moment where two players fought for the ball – the ball was away and going behind the German goalkeeper, who did not run for it, but for Battiston and hit him with all his massive weight. The Frenchman was down, out, and in hospital for months. It was doubtful he will ever play again. Schumacher just walked away unconcerned, untroubled, even impatient with the lengthy stoppage of the match. The referee was absolutely silent – no card, not even verbal warning. Nothing. A telling point of the 1980s football – even murder was permitted. France was not broke down by the awful incident, but he regular time ended 1-1. Technically, the result was right: Fischer was denied of goal by excellent save by Ettori and in the very last minute Amoros hit the crossbar. Could have been 2-2, was 1-1.

This was the end of France, many felt – no matter how good, there was no way stopping the Germans in extra-time, because they were capable of running in high speed for ever. The French were physically weaker. Yet, the extra-time was not Germans rolling over the French – both teams seemingly increased the already fast tempo and abandoned all caution, moving into spectacular attacks. Tresor scored in the 92nd minute and in the 98th Giresse made it 3-1 for France. May be too much too early… it was time France to kill the speed, to start wasting time, even to play dirty, and keep the ball in midfield, but it was not a team capable of such tricks – France repeated the Brazilian approach, which appeared naïve and reckless in retrospect: they kept the tempo and continued to attack. But Germans are never mentally destroyed, no matter the result, and their physical superiority and determination was important and started to show. Rummenigge was fielded in the 96th minute and it was him scoring a second German goal in the 102nd minute. France was still leading at the end of the first half of extra-time, but Germany was more dangerous and quickly equalized after the start of the second 15 minutes: Fischer scored in the 109th minute. France practically lost by trying to outplay West Germany. The Germans extracted the maximum of this match, in which they were poorer in football terms.

Penalty shoot-out is really gambling – there was no ‘better’ team, anyone could win, luck plays a big role. When it came to shoot-out… the Germans had the edge, having better and intimidating goal-keeper, plus nerves of iron. The French had weaker mentality, affected by losing their lead of 2 goals, by missing some scoring opportunities, by the brutal destruction of Battiston. Six missed his penalty and Bossis immediately after him. Hrubesch scored. France was out. West Germany reached the final. It was truly a moment of mourning, for the game lost and brutality won – the Germans had no friends, but that was the final result, nothing to be said about it – they scored their penalties and the French did not. A war of nerves the Germans never lost.

Without Brazil the semi-finals lost some of its shine, but there was nothing to be done. Italy and Poland met for a second time this championship and expectations were quite different: Italy was rapidly improving from match to match, Poland seemingly reached its highest possible point. Italy had the edge for two reasons: the first was having well rounded team, which found its own chemistry and was classier anyway. The second reason was the absent players: both teams had to be without key players – Gentile and Boniek, both missing the match for having two yellow cards. To a point, no really big deal, for surely Gentile would have been attached to Boniek and more than likely destroyed his game. But Italy had strong replacement for Gentile who in any case was not the organizer of the team play. Boniek was a big loss for Poland, which did not have another playmaker. True, Boniek was moved ahead in the previous games and that was a result of another problem: Szarmach was clearly out of form and Iwan got early injury. Suddenly, Poland had attacking problems, which Boniek compensated for before, but now there was nobody left. Lato was moved into his typical position in the attacking line and Ciolek was replaced Boniek, but he was not the needed playmaker. Bearzot worried about injuries as well – Colovatti and Tardelli were under question after the match with Brazil, but luckily for Bearzot both were fixed quickly and came on the field. Bergomi, who replaced Gentile, was attached as a personal marker to Lato – no matter what, Italy followed its iron strategy: mark closely the opponent’s star and only after that pay attention to the other net. Defense first – and the initial Polish assault was quickly neutralized. Italy showed teeth after that and it became clear they were the stronger and much more dangerous team. Scoring opportunities emerged.

Paolo Rossi scored in the 22nd minute. The Italians more or less dominated the game, but Poland was still dangerous, especially Lato, who had excellent match. Unfortunately, there was little creativity in midfield and no matter what Lato tried, it was humanly impossible for him to both organize and finish attacks. Smolarek was nowhere to be seen, having his worst match at this championship – he was substituted by Kusto in the 79th minute, perhaps too late.

In the 74th minute Rossi scored his second goal and the match was practically over – the last minutes Italy obviously killed time, which the viewers naturally disliked. Poland tried to the end, but there was no way to compensate the absence of Boniek – in the second half the central defender Zmuda moved ahead to help the midfielders, which was more than risky, considering the lethal Italian strikers fed by Antognoni. Zoff also had a fine day, saving dangerous shots, but Poland clearly did not have smart enough player – traditionally, Zoff was shaky saving long shots and no Polish player tested his weakness. Italy won and rightly so 2-0 and reached the final. Perhaps the most important aspect of this victory was that it came relatively easy and Italy saved both physical and mental energy for the final.

Group D. France, Austria, and Northern Ireland. France was expected to win, overwhelmingly so, for they were perhaps the next exciting team after Brazil so far. And improving from match to match too. Austria was limited, but tough enough for some trouble, but going ahead was to be a miracle. Northern Ireland was seen without any chance – the team depended on enthusiasm and they overperformed so far, but this energy was spent. Northern Ireland did more than normally capable of, so the team reached its end.

France – Austria. Platini and Lacombe were injured and replaced. Austria had no such problems . Hidalgo appeared worried before the game, when he emphasized that his team lacks strikers like Krankl and Schachner. To a point, he was right: Rocheteau customary missed most opportunities and was not comfortable at the center-forward position. Six was tired. Soler, usually a substitute, was a double of Rocheteau – missing almost every striking opportunity. But the midfield more than compensated for the traditional weakness of the French strikers – Giresse, Tigana, and Genghini had fantastic match, feeling frier without Platini next to them.

Genghini scored from a free kick in the 39th minute and although this was the only goal of the match, there was no uncertainty about the winner. France flied. Austria was nothing much and many observers blamed their rigged match with West Germany – it looked like Austria lost its rhythm and after walking for 90 minutes aimlessly was simply unable to come back to some meaningful football. France was superior and the closest team to the kind of football Brazil played. A delight, despite the small 1-0 victory.

The second match – Austria – Northern Ireland – brought to life a peculiar problem of the new championship format: it was possible to calculate and scheme during an actual match and save some efforts. Austria did not recover fighting form, but brave Northern Ireland, the original outsider, played another wonderful match.

Hamilton scored in the 28th minute and the first half ended with Northern Ireland leading 1-0. Pezzey equalized in the 50th minute, and got the lead with a second goal, but the Irish were still stronger and pushed forward. And equalized in the with another goal by Hamilton in the 75th minute. At this moment calculations made the match meaningless. Austria was out not only with a tie, but even if they won. Norther Ireland had to beat France to go ahead, no matter how this match finished – even if they lost, they had a chance to reach the semi-finals. Suddenly, the new formula was absurd: winning meant nothing for one team, and losing also meant nothing for the other. The match finished 2-2.

Northern Ireland – France. Platini was back and France needed only a tie. The Irish had to win to go ahead. Hidalgo was not to risk playing for a tie against hearty opponent, but made change of the playing scheme, which proved very effective: Platini was moved ahead, not a typical center-forward, but a forward coming from the deep back – British defenders had no experience with such approach. Rocheteau was moved to his normal position as a winger, so instead of wasting scoring opportunities he had to deliver sharp passes to the center of the field.

France attacked from start and their inventive combinations were too much for the simple Irish players. Of course, the Irish fought as best as possible, but were simply outplayed. In the 71st minute the match was practically finished – France was leading 3-0. Armstrong still scored in the 76th minute, for no matter what Northern Ireland did not give up, but Giresse scored his second goal in the 81st minute anyway. 4-1 and France reached the semi-finals to the delight of everybody liking attractive attacking football.

France                       2 2 0 0 5 1 +4 4

Austria                      2 0 1 1 2 3 −1 1

Northern Ireland  2 0 1 1 3 6 −3 1

The group finished as expected, which was just fine, for France really deserved to go ahead. Northern Ireland outdid itself at this championship and captured the sympathy of many – the boys played bravely, giving the best, even more than their best. Austria was nothing much and because of the shameless fixed match with West Germany many people felt they deserved to go out just in the name of restoring justice. Objectively, it was felt that the team already reached the limit of its potential and already was on the road down. The key players were few, they aged, and there were no new players pf the same class. France was a revelation and seemingly getting stronger with each next match, but it was a team with weaknesses, put under scrutiny now, when Brazil paid so high prize for relatively minor details: France lacked good goalkeeper. Ettori, French observers pointed out, was too emotional under pressure and not a great keeper, but Baratelli and Castaneda were no better either, similarly nervous. The problems with strikers were old and there was no solution to them. The team was unable to find and keep its game under pressure from start – the match against England was a heavy warning. Yet, this was the team most people rooted for – the most exciting team after Brazil and the best hope that artistic football will win.

Group C – the other iron group: Argentina, Brazil, and Italy. From what was shown so far, Brazil had the edge. Argentina had a chance only if starting playing close to what made them world champions in 1978 – which was possible and hoped for – and Italy so far struggled tremendously just to reach this stage and unlikely to improve. The Italians were tough customer under any circumstances, but with their current form only a miracle was going to help them. Yet, the situation was the same as in Group B – small differences, no big favourite, anything possible.

Italy and Argentina opened the group – which benefited Brazil a little, for they would know what to play for and see the opponents in action, may be even canceling each other out. What not just the Brazilians saw was special in perverse way: both Argentina and Italy had long tradition of playing dirty, but apparently the Italians elevated their brutal skills to an art. The referee was severely criticized after the match, but it was often next to impossible to give even yellow card to artful murderers. Menotti recalled the only option the officials had: rule 12, stipulating that serial offender should be red-carded. But what exactly was a serial offender? Especially in those days, when a penalty was given only if the brought down player was actually dead and the Police showed undeniable evidence of the murder weapon. Football was clearly way back in the minds of both teams, but still it was clear that Argentina did not improve at all and Italy, quite surprisingly, did.

During the match emerged the anti-climax: Maradona once again produced nothing, thus confirming European doubts about his real class. Now, he appeared heavily inflated youngster, all image and no substance. Also Menotti made a mistake by moving him from midfield to purely attacking position. Next to him was Gentile – the ‘big hero’ of the match, who not only kicked Maradona every time the ball came near the Argentine, but had enough time to rip Ardiles’ jersey and commit some more atrocities here and there. Menotti counted 20 fouls delivered by Gentile to Maradona, but Bearzot only said that if Maradona played in midfield, as expected, Tardelli would have been his personal killer, not gentle Gentile. Gentile got yellow card, but only in the 41st minute and after 4 yellow cards were given to… strikers (Maradona, Ardiles, Kempes and sole Italian – Rossi). Their major crimes were arguing with and complaining to the referee… and what else the strikers could do when they were kicked all the time? In the little time left between kicks and arguing crimes and innocence, the Italians played a bit of football and scored 2 goals in the second half. Passarella scored one for Argentina, but it was the 82rd minute already and there was no time for more. Italy 2 – Argentina 1.

Argentina – Brazil. Argentina pushed from the start, but Brazil neutralized the initial assault and turned around the game quickly. Both teams were attacking-minded and although there was no lave lost between the old rivals, at least neither team tried to kill the game. Entertaining match in which Brazil shined and scored in the in the 12th minute – Eder missed a penalty, but the ball bounced back from the bar and Zico kicked it in the net. Argentina had a good opportunity near the end of the first half, but Valdir Peres saved. During the break Menotti changed his playing scheme: Kempes was replaced with Diaz for the second half and Maradona was moved back to midfield. Too late already – Brazil was still the more active, inventive, and dangerous team and in the 74th minute was leading 3-0. Argentina managed to score a goal in the 88th minute, but they were already ‘former world champions’ by then.

Maradona was red-carded, which put a sour end of his world cup: the opinion of him seemingly changed – not a great young star, but inflated persona, whose actual performance was less than ordinary. At the other side, Brazilians shined – Falcao made fantastic match. Serginho seemingly improved, Junior, Socrates, and Zico were perfect. Except Zico was injured and had to be substituted in the 85th minute. Brazil 3 – Argentina 1. Although Menotti said that Brazil needs to play better against Italy, than they played against Argentina, there was no doubt that Brazil will qualify to the semi-finals and most likely win the world cup.

Italy – Argentina. Only victory worked for Italy – and they were not exactly winners, neither by tradition, nor by what they showed so far. A tie worked for Brazil just fine, but this was not a squad playing for ties. It was all or nothing, a kind of game favouring Brazil. When the match started, it became clear that Bearzot managed to introduce a bit of change into his tactic: yes, Italy minded defense first of all, as ever, but were not so heavily entrenched in their own half, but concentrated in midfield, which helped them to organize much quicker their counter-attacks. Yes, they used personal cover as before – Gentile was attached to Zico, Oriali to Eder, and Collovati (later Bergomi) to Serginho – and Gentile was still dirty and brutal, but it was nearly as static approach as it was in the previous matches, so the Italians had more players involved with attacks. Meantime, Brazil came close to the ideal of total football, playing great and minding only the opposite net. May be because of that Italy was unable to kill the game, waiting for chancy opportunity, but also went into attacking play. Attractive match, in which Paolo Rossi became the central figure – and scored first very early, in the 4th minute. Brazil equalized in the 12th, thanks to Socrates. Then Rossi scored again – in the 25th minute. Crucial moment – Brazil was never the most cool team under pressure on one hand, and, on the other, minimal lead was usually automatic signal for the Italians to move back into iron defense, start wasting time, and disrupt the match by all possible means, mostly of the illegal kind. But Brazil was surprisingly cool, as if nothing happened, and continued to attack in high tempo, which Italy was unable to break at all and may be because of that Italy actually continued to play in rather attacking fashion.

In the second half Brazil managed to equalize again, thanks to Falcao, but Italy was more than worthy opponent – Rossi was unstoppable and score a third goal in the 75th minute. Brazil was unable to equalize and was out… Italy 3 – Brazil 2.

 

Italy               2 2 0 0 5 3 +2 4

Brazil              2 1 0 1 5 4 +1 2

Argentina    2 0 0 2 2 5 −3 0

Surprize ending of this group, but Italy deserved to win – they vastly improved their game at this stage, every next match better than the previous. Argentina was disappointment for the start of the championship and was rightly eliminated. Menotti recognized his own mistakes somewhat, but reluctantly. Brazil unfortunately lost, which was more than sad – they were the most entertaining team, the most creative, and tactically rich. But it became painfully after the match with Italy that times changed… Brazil had a big weakness: no good goalkeeper. 10 years ago it was not a problem for those introducing total football – Ajax and Holland had mediocre keepers and hardly mattered, for they not only were able to outscore everybody, but mostly because the ball rarely came near the net. Now such dominance was no longer possible and teams depending on physical play and constant pressure had a chance. The battle was moved entirely to midfield and any mistake could be lethal – either missed scoring opportunity, or letting the opposition some space. Too bad Brazil was going home. Italy played well and getting stronger, but they were not even nearly as fun as Brazil was. It came to the painful point that tactics win over creativity, improvisation, and desire to outplay and outscore the opponent.

 

Group B. Apart from British football chauvinism and Spanish blind faith, the real assessment favoured only the Germans: the hope that England could somehow start stronger more or less was abandoned in 1980. Spain was not a winning team. Only West Germany was a team capable of improving and may be starting to play something at last. The group was very tough, but… Spain was unlikely winner: if lucky, concentrated, and with some official’s help, they could go ahead. The limits of the team were obvious, especially when it came to attacking – no creativity and no scoring. England… tough, fighting to the end, attacking, but still typical British in approach, lacking tactical diversity, somewhat slower than usual, creatively impoverished, but there was hope that Keegan, Brooking, Wilkins, Francis could prevail in a good day. Only the Germans had potential – having Breitner in midfield, the only midfielder in this group capable of magical passes. If Derwal managed to get the right mixture of players, if Rummenigge find his touch at last, if the team start playing like 1980… after all, it was the same in 1974 and eventually the right combination was worked out. West Germany was seemingly the likelier winner of the group with Spain last, but in the same time three physical, tough, and rather bland squads were perfectly capable of canceling each other out. There was big and nightmarish possibility all matches ending 0-0. And then what? And injuries enforced the scary scenario: Rummenigge and Keegan were under question and their weak performance so far was entirely blamed on the injuries they arrived at the finals with.

England – West Germany. What was expected to be fast, attacking, direct clash of two giants turned out to be an icy game – slow and watchful, both teams really moved like icebergs, waiting for a chancy opening, for tiny mistake of the other side. Neither coach risked some tactical innovation, not even change of players – injured Rummenigge was on the field. Magath was on the bench even when Hansi Muller was so far disappointing. Littbarski was on the bench. Fischer was on the bench. The only change Derwall made was the opposite of what seemingly should have been done: the Germans started the match with 2 strikers. Cautious, defensively-minded approach. Greenwood left Keegan and Brooking out of the starters, which also looked like mistake – perhaps that was the match they could really help. Viv Anderson was also on the bench. Only on the surface Greenwood’s choice looked ‘daring’ – at a closer look, it was clear that he chose starters close to straight-forward English approach. Nothing surprising for the Germans.

And both teams moved icily cool back and forth, every move predictable, every clash predictable, and bored viewers to death. After the match Dettmar Kramer said about his compatriots “I don’t hope this team could improve its game’. The match ended 0-0. It was not like the teams did not want to win… they were just incapable of finding a way to win.

West Germany – Spain. Derwall risked some tactical changes at last, yet, without going rally far. Useless Rummenigge was again a starter. Fischer and Littbarski were starters and Brigel was moved back to midfield. Hansi Muller was entirely out, not even among the reserves, but… Magath was not fielded. Spain was the same as before – really, who was there to replace the starters? The reserves were more or less just copies of the starters, weaker copies. Santillana was back among the starters – may be included too late for producing some positive change.

The opponents run, time run, the dark cloud of the worst scenario was getting darker… the ominous zeroes on the scoreboard. Eventually, the Germans scored in 50th minute, thanks to Littbarski and in the 75th minute Fischer scored a second goal. In the 81st minute Zamora scored for Spain and the worst scenario returned… but all ended 2-1 for West Germany. Spain was out. ‘Luck’ was the word chosen by observers – ‘lucky Germans, unlucky Spaniards’. That was all… neither team deserved a commentary on tactics, style, anything related to playing aspect. Rummenigge and Arconada, the greatest stars of the teams, were singled out for criticism. So obvious were the limitations of the hosts by now, that their elimination provoked no big outcry in Spain – it was clear nothing can be done with a team like that.

England – Spain. The hosts had to play only for their pride. England had to win with 2 goals difference to qualify. Greenwood decided to use 3 forwards, which appeared to be massive innovation for those following the English national team – they played with 2 strikers practically forever. Keegan and Brooking were back at last, kind of – both were listed as reserves.

And once again nothing interesting on the field… it was only painfully clear that England did not have a real playmaker and no matter what was said about the ‘great innovations’ Greenwood introduced, his team was playing the old English direct style, which for years led to nowhere and so was in this match too. Keegan and Brooking were fielded together at last in the 64th minute, only to show how costly coach’s errors and fears could be: they invigorated England, but there was no enough time. 0-0.

 

West Germany      2 1 1 0 2 1 +1  3

England                    2 0 2 0  0 0 0 2

Spain                         2 0 1 1 1 2 −1 1

Well, the group finished as expected. Everything was just as expected… except that football suffered. It was time to mock Luis Kubala – before the start of the second round he called the 12 teams ‘the apostels of modern football’. The ‘apostels’ not only did not show anything new and exciting, they rather showed descend and the only word to correctly describe them was ‘boring stiffs’. It applied to more teams, but this group was only that from start to finish. Even the English did not make much noise of the fact that their team exited the championship unbeaten – big deal, if they were no losers, since they were no winners either. If there was some interesting football played – collectively! – by this three teams, it would be only England against France. Some world leaders…